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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper uses a case study of a loan guarantee fund of $800,000 provided by the Ford 
Foundation to the Grameen Bank in 1981 as a framework for offering reflections on 
current debates within US philanthropy on accountability, support for innovation, risk 
taking and impact.  Ford’s loan guarantee fund leveraged commercial bank lending to 
Grameen Bank.  The subsequent high rates of loan repayment by loan recipients 
convinced commercial bankers of the viability of Muhammad Yunus’ model of lending 
to poor entrepreneurs unable to provide traditional loan collateral.    
 
The paper develops the concept of “accountability regimes,” and argues that foundations 
engaged in international poverty reduction are better able, institutionally, to bear risk in 
support of innovation than multilateral and bilateral aid organizations such as the World 
Bank and USAID.  That said, recent interviews of a small sample of executives whose 
foundations fund poverty work abroad suggest ambivalent attitudes toward funding 
innovative and risky projects.  This is attributed, in part, to high expectations on the part 
of foundation boards and top executives that foundation-funded programs show positive, 
early and measurable impact.  The great diversity of the US philanthropic community, 
and the commitment of many foundations to important charitable activities that are not 
necessarily inviting of innovation, further explains a more modest investment by US 
philanthropy in the kind of innovative work that they are uniquely sanctioned to support. 
 
Encouraging foundations to be more open to supporting innovative initiatives, the paper 
next offers three operational principles, drawn mainly from the Grameen case study, 
which foundations might observe in their poverty reduction initiatives.  These are: the 
strongest ideas are likely to come from individuals and organizations outside of 
foundations working close to the problems; long-term impact assessments should focus 
on achievement of administrative and policy reforms in institutions that matter in the 
lives of poor people and; active and early engagement with governments, the private 
sector and publicly-funded donors will increase the chances that new ideas, once 
successfully tested, will bring about systemic change. 
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The Parable of the Professor and the Foundation: 
Lessons in Philanthropic Accountability, Risk, and Impact 
 
 
In the 1970s, Muhammad Yunus had this now familiar idea that commercial banks could 
successfully lend money to poor people in Bangladesh who did not own the kinds of 
traditional assets, such as titled land and houses, typically needed to collateralize loans. 
By making loans to individuals through groups of peers and neighbors, a mix of mutual 
support and social pressure would ensure that individual loans were repaid.  In 1981 
Yunus, then an economics professor at Chittagong University, was preparing to test the 
new lending model on a large scale.  As recounted in his autobiography, Banker to the 
Poor,1 he approached commercial banks in Bangladesh and asked them to capitalize the 
Grameen Bank’s five-year expansion plan, that aimed to open dozens of branch offices in 
five rural districts in addition to those in Jobra village and Tangail district, where Yunus 
had been testing group lending models since 1976 and 1979 respectively.  Grameen was 
at the time a special project under the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, 
and the ability to raise funds on commercial terms was seen by Yunus as a key test of 
Grameen’s viability as a banking model and essential to its expansion nationally.2  The 
commercial banks declined Yunus’ initial request for capital.  Banks have complex 
accountability regimes (a concept I discuss further below) consisting of depositors, 
shareholders, and regulators that act to ensure deposits will be safe and the bank will 
remain solvent.  In the absence of collateral, poor people were not seen by bank managers 
as credit-worthy customers. 
 
Yunus came to understand the immediate problem as one of reducing the risks to 
commercial banks of investing in Grameen in the face of uncertainty as to how his new 
loan repayment model would work out.  So he went to the Ford Foundation’s office in 
Dhaka and asked for an $800,000 loan guarantee fund as security against commercial 
bank lending.  After careful appraisal by senior staff, Ford agreed to the request and 
deposited the requested funds3 in a Grameen account at a London bank.  Bangladeshi 
banks in turn agreed to Grameen’s request to capitalize the planned expansion of 
operations, on commercial terms.  The new repayment model worked, the commercial 
banks got their money back with interest, and the rest, as it were, is history.  Yunus had 
made good on his initial assurances to the foundation that he would never have to dip into 
the loan guarantee fund.  “The fact that it is there” he told Ford staff, “will do the 
magic.”4
 
I find the story of this partnership between Muhammad Yunus and the Ford Foundation 
compelling in a number of ways.  Most importantly, it demonstrates how private 
foundations are able to take on risk on behalf of new approaches to poverty reduction in 
ways that other institutions, including financial institutions such as commercial banks and 
publicly-financed donors such the US Agency for International Development (USAID), 
often cannot. Once the new ideas and practices that foundations are willing to fund 
initially are proven, banks, governments and other kinds of donors are more likely to 
incorporate them into their own work and in ways that may have far-reaching impact on 
the lives of poor people.    
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Building on the case study of Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, this paper seeks 
to explain why foundations are better able to support risky but potentially ground-
breaking new approaches to poverty reduction in ways that other kinds of institutions 
cannot.  It is not clear that foundations for which poverty reduction is a priority take full 
advantage of their distinctive ability to support innovative work.  As a result, 
opportunities to foster essential changes in the policies and practices of key  
institutions—including in government and the private sector—that very directly affect the 
lives of poor people may be lost.  The paper concludes with recommendations on how 
foundations concerned with poverty reduction might make fuller use of their distinctive 
and important advantages. 
 
Foundations can bear greater levels of risk than other kinds of institutions. 
 
Various categories of organizations display different kinds of accountability regimes.  An 
accountability regime is the mix of formal rules and informal protocols and 
conventions—public and private, external and internal, moral and ethical—that condition 
organizational decision making in the face of opportunity, uncertainty and risk.   
 
The Grameen case suggests that the differences in accountability regimes faced by 
foundations and commercial banks have implications for their respective tolerances for 
certain kinds of risk.  If Yunus’ experiment had failed one might imagine the president of 
the Ford Foundation telling his board, “Well, we appraised this very carefully. It seemed 
like a good idea.  And supporting ideas that have promise of giving poor people better 
access to opportunity is part of what we do. Taking on risk requires us to be prepared to 
accept a certain amount of failure.” One might imagine a sadly different conversation in 
the bank’s board room if the loan had failed and the manager had approved it in the 
absence of Ford’s loan guarantee.   
 
Comparing accountability regimes of for-profit organizations like banks with not-for-
profit organizations such as foundations presents some interesting “apple-and-orange” 
analytical challenges.  For private firms, accountability is directly connected to 
performance in competitive market environments.  Survival, profitability and investment 
returns are among the precise and rigorous criteria against which the market and 
shareholders evaluate private firms and their executives and boards.  The tax-exemption 
granted to foundations and other nonprofit organizations is not based on demonstrating 
measurable results, but upon pursuing a recognized charitable mission with the intention 
of providing social benefit.     
 
Importantly, accountability regimes vary among different kinds of donors engaged in 
international development and poverty reduction.  The World Bank is governed by a 
board consisting of 22 national governments, its loans are negotiated with beneficiary 
governments, and it raises much of its finance in global financial markets.  World Bank 
policies and loans are subject to a particularly complex combination of political scrutiny 
and market discipline that favors the orthodox and tested approach over the innovative 
and risky.   
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The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is an entity of the US 
Department of State, and in addition to its important development work, serves a variety 
of US national and global political interests.  Unlike foundations, USAID’s funding is 
appropriated directly from the federal budget and its policy and programming decisions 
are subject to high levels of Congressional scrutiny.  USAID’s mission, goals and budget 
are subject to a great number of claims and pressures from a diverse community of 
constituency groups.  USAID has numerous political detractors, often making 
administrators averse to taking on innovative and risky projects where they would have to 
explain before Congress the “waste” of taxpayers’ dollars if they should fail.   The World 
Bank, USAID and other large multilateral and bilateral donors have a mandate to fund 
major sector development programs, often involving large investments in agricultural, 
transportation, educational and health infrastructure, at levels of expenditure significantly 
beyond the budgets of foundations. 
 
Philanthropic accountability regimes are, on the other hand, arguably simpler and less 
subject to close public supervision or market discipline.5  Foundations are accountable 
through US tax law for assuring the public that tax-exempt foundation dollars are being 
used for bona fide tax-exempt purposes, such as for education, health care, research and 
charitable relief.  In 1969, Congress passed legislation requiring foundations to pay out 
five percent of the value of their endowment annually on charitable works and 
management costs.6  Foundations have an ethical responsibility not to spend lavish 
amounts of money on themselves, taking into account the need to employ and adequately 
reward professional staff to shape programs and manage and monitor grant portfolios.  If 
particularly risky ventures should fail, they do not have to pay anyone back.  These 
considerations have from time to time accommodated, I believe, a greater appetite for 
supporting innovative and risky work—such as the early development of microfinance—
among philanthropic donors than institutions such as the World Bank and USAID. 
 
 In fact, where new ideas developed with philanthropic funding show promising results 
(in other words, are looking less risky), publicly-financed donors are often willing to 
provide funding support at levels that may enable the work to be brought to scale in ways 
that foundations, with their smaller budgets, cannot.  Indeed, microfinance programs are 
today ubiquitous elements in the poverty-reduction strategies of the World Bank, USAID 
and a great number of other donors. 
 
Do we see a greater proclivity on the part of foundations to support experimental and 
risky approaches to poverty reduction than say the World Bank or USAID?  The data and 
even methodology needed to offer a conclusive answer to this question are lacking.7 
However, a recent unpublished study summarizing interviews with current or former 
executives of seven of the largest fifteen US foundations that fund poverty reduction in 
developing countries provides some useful insight.  The study found that supporting 
innovative programs does not appear to be a central tenet of philanthropic strategy.8 The 
study drew the following conclusions: 
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• Support for explicitly innovative approaches to poverty reduction is a small and 
probably decreasing part of what foundations do. 
 
• High expectations on the part of foundation boards and top executives that 
foundation-funded programs show positive, early and measurable impact reduce 
tolerance for innovation and risk. 
 
• While foundation leaders recognize the value of supporting local leaders and 
organizations, they are reluctant to fund non-US 501(c)3 organizations, especially 
when the granting foundation does not have an office in the country where the 
work is being carried out.  US organizations perform reliably and to a high 
standard, but they are wedded to organization-wide policies and practices that 
may not be inviting of local innovation.   
 
• Post-9/11 international compliance regulations and legal uncertainties are having 
a chilling effect on making grants to non-US organizations.  
 
Although these findings are based on a small number of interviews, they are not 
surprising in light of the diversity of the US philanthropic community.  In the words of 
Joel Fleishman, “Every foundation is sui generis, each reflecting the personalities, values, 
goals, and talents of the key people behind it.”9  Foundation program priorities may be 
quite firmly established by their founders, and may or may not encompass areas of 
endeavor where systemic social or institutional change is considered an ultimate measure 
of achievement.  
 
Surely, trustees would imagine their stewardship responsibilities to extend to ensuring 
some discernable impact from the programs and grants they approve.  US philanthropy 
provides the US and the world great service through its support for educational, health 
care and arts institutions that yield clear social benefits not dependent on achievement of 
systemic changes in governance or markets.  
 
That said, it should also be clear that the kinds of systemic changes exemplified by 
Yunus’ new model for bank lending are needed in greater number and in many places 
around the world if significant progress is to be made in reducing poverty.  
 
Powerful ideas come from outside of foundations. 
 
Good ideas have many sources of inspiration, but the powerful insights that Muhammad 
Yunus had about banks and their underserved but potentially viable clients in rural 
Bangladesh had very particular antecedents.  Yunus lived and worked near to the 
community he wished to serve, he had an intimate knowledge of his country’s social, 
economic and political institutions, and he applied what are clearly strong analytical 
skills and intuitive powers to the problems he encountered.  He also demonstrated a talent 
for persuading leaders of key institutions—banks, government agencies, foundations and 
other donors—of the potential viability of his ideas.  A person of thought and action, an 
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insightful analyst and incisive leader, Yunus is a model of the kind of rare social 
innovator that foundations should be most receptive to supporting.   
 
The example of Muhammad Yunus’ partnership with the Ford Foundation suggests some 
lessons for the posture of foundations and the role of foundation program staff in relation 
to prospective grantees.   
 
First, foundations should have their doors wide open to the potentially powerful ideas of 
people outside of philanthropy who are in a position to test and champion those ideas in 
the complex social, economic and political environments in which they live and work. 
That Yunus did not have to penetrate several layers of Ford Foundation bureaucracy is a 
testament to the Foundation’s understanding that vital experience and knowledge is 
located throughout the societies in which Ford made grants, and not only in its offices in 
Dhaka and New York.  Foundation program staff should be constantly in search of 
people distinguished for the sophistication and power of their ideas and their practical 
understanding of what it takes to bring about meaningful change in their societies. 
   
Moreover, the Grameen Bank case illustrates the difference between general knowledge 
of markets and market institutions, such as commercial banks, and particularistic 
knowledge of the differing social and cultural environments in which banks may operate, 
and the importance of having command over both.  It was an axiom of development 
economics that a constraint to the flow of commercial credit to poor people was their 
inability to marshal collateral.  It required Yunus’ particular knowledge of Bangladeshi 
rural society and cultural resources to fashion a socially-mediated set of protocols and 
incentives for assuring loan repayment.  
 
Program staff should have strong conceptual and analytical skills and a considerable 
amount of general knowledge about the societies in which they work. Foundation staff 
should not be asked to shape highly detailed and specific program strategies within their 
fields of general responsibility.  Narrow program frames may have the effect of 
prematurely rejecting consideration of potentially powerful ideas because they “don’t fit 
my program.”  For instance, where a foundation makes a commitment to supporting 
microfinance institutions and staffs its poverty division with mainly microfinance 
specialists, it is increasing the possibility that unforeseen future breakthrough ideas for 
reducing poverty that are not related to microfinance get overlooked.  Being alert to 
changes in the big picture is a vital staff capacity.  
 
Board members can encourage the foundations they steward to be more open to the ideas 
of social innovators.  By conveying a passion for innovation and an understanding that 
successful innovations typically emerge only after prolonged periods of trial and error, 
boards can sanction risk taking on the part of executives and staff.  Board members surely 
must take account of organizational mission, founders’ intent and their traditional 
fiduciary responsibilities, but observance of these responsibilities should in no way 
preclude openness to the powerful ideas of individuals and organizations working close 
to the problems.10    
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Efforts to better measure impact are a good thing, but they should not have an 
inadvertent chilling effect on innovation.     
 
It is essential that current calls for greater foundation accountability not put the brakes to 
philanthropy’s unique capacity to support innovation.  Surely, certain improvements in 
accountability protocols are appropriate.  Some foundations have clarified and tightened 
internal decision-making processes to reduce the danger of trustee conflicts of interest.  
Resources are being set aside to support evaluations and impact assessments.  A number 
of foundations are making efforts to invite beneficiary communities and grantees into 
discussions about strategy and impact.  These efforts may have the positive effect of 
giving the public greater overall confidence in foundation governance and management 
in ways that may come to increase the public’s tolerance for foundation risk-taking. 
 
The growing emphasis on quantitative measures of short-term impact can, however, shift 
the energies and attention of foundation program officers and grantees away from the 
hard work of fostering the kinds of systemic changes that are often needed to improve the 
lives of poor people.  In a recent speech at Bates College, former Ford Foundation 
president Susan Berresford warned of the danger of “miniaturizing ambition” when 
foundations put too much pressure on themselves and on grantees to demonstrate short-
term, measurable impacts.  When your goal is social justice, the relevant indices can be 
amorphous and hard to define, but their long-term and systemic impacts can eventually 
be described.  They may indeed speak to significant achievements. 
 
Short-term performance indices alone have limited value in evaluating systemic change 
and are insufficient measures of its ultimate achievement. In my view, the kind of social 
entrepreneurism represented by Muhammad Yunus was concerned with fostering new 
ideas about how financial institutions could refashion their practices and programs in 
ways to better serve poor people.  This view of social entrepreneurship, which focuses on 
the force of ideas rather than charismatic personalities alone, “moves the field toward 
defining entrepreneurship in a broader way that includes organizational and 
administrative reforms.”11  Actual achievement of essential reforms is the kind of 
practical measure of impact that evaluators concerned with systemic change should be 
following over time.  
 
Achieving systemic change requires foundations and their grantees to work with 
governments, the private sector and publicly-funded donors early in the life-cycle of a 
promising idea.  
 
For Muhammad Yunus, the essential goal was changing the lending policies of 
commercial banks in ways that gave poor people access to credit.  Yunus told Adrienne 
Germain, the Ford Foundation representative in Dhaka in 1981, “I want to offer a 
guarantee to the commercial bankers who are supporting us so that they can’t back out of 
the expansion because it is too risky.”12 Importantly, commercial banks were participants 
in the experiment from the outset, their participation facilitated by the Ford loan 
guarantee fund.   
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US philanthropies principally funded public institutions in the first thirty years of their 
engagement in developing countries, from the early 1950s to the early 1980s.  For a 
number of reasons, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations began in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s to shift their funding away from government agencies, public universities and 
research institutes and quasi-independent development banks toward nonprofit 
organizations.  Nonprofit organizations were seen to be less subject to the bureaucratic 
and political constraints of government and were often led by resourceful, dedicated and 
innovative new leaders.  Significantly, large foundations that have begun funding 
internationally in recent years, such as Gates, Atlantic Philanthropies, Starr, Hewlett and 
Packard, have followed in the path forged by Ford and Rockefeller of principally funding 
nonprofit organizations. 
 
Foundation funding has arguably proven decisive to the growth and independence of civil 
society in many countries around the world.  But one of the consequences of the historic 
shift of foundation funding to the nonprofit sector is narrowed scope for direct 
engagement by foundations with governments on important public policy questions. This 
need not necessarily be a problem when the NGOs funded by foundations are engaging 
effectively with their governments on matters of shared interest.  But problems do arise, 
in my view, where NGOs are not mixing it up with governments where current public 
policy is an impediment to the achievement of a program’s goals, or where new 
government policies can bring considerable benefit.  Governments, the private sector and 
large, traditional nonprofit institutions such as churches are vitally important institutions, 
and their policies toward the poor are often what foundations and civil society should be 
seeking to influence as a matter of priority.      
 
We are not able to assess the record of transfer of promising new ideas from civil society 
to mainstream institutions in this paper. That record merits study.  The lesson of Grameen 
is that when Yunus began to test the new lending model beyond the relatively controlled 
confines of his home district, he purposely engaged the institutions he understood he had 
to change—commercial banks—in the experiment from the outset.  Yunus suffered 
considerable frustration as a result of his very early engagement with the Bangladesh 
Central Bank and a number of commercial banks.  Officials of these institutions were 
endlessly skeptical of the viability of his plans.  But his early encounters with state 
officials and commercial bankers deepened his understanding of the obstacles he had to 
overcome to change the banking system fundamentally.   
 
The risks and rewards of philanthropic freedom. 
 
Bearing risk on behalf of social and institutional changes that give poor people greater 
access to the benefits of markets, education, health care and political representation and 
human rights is philanthropy’s great opportunity. I believe that foundations enjoy greater 
public sanction to carry risk on behalf of social innovation than many philanthropists and 
foundation executives appreciate.  I also believe that, while the kind of insightful thinking 
and astute leadership qualities demonstrated by Muhammad Yunus are not commonplace, 
foundations can make no better contribution than to look outward and support people of 
comparable judgment and experience and the organizations and movements that they 
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lead.  I also believe that foundations have greater impact when they support efforts to 
change how governments, the private sector and other institutions that touch the lives of 
poor people respond to their circumstances and problems.  
 
Poor people in developing countries live with uncertainty and bear risks on behalf of a 
better life that few of those who live in developed countries can imagine.  Their prospects 
are made harder when key institutions, public and private, national and international, 
can’t figure out how to bend and refashion their own purposes and policies in ways that 
give poor people access to the kinds of resources, benefits and protections those with 
greater wealth take for granted.  This was Muhammad Yunus’ great achievement.  He 
saw in poor farmers and business people considerable entrepreneurial acumen stymied by 
lack of access to loan capital.  Yunus fashioned an experiment using Ford Foundation 
risk capital that changed fundamentally how commercial banks in Bangladesh viewed the 
credit-worthiness of poor people.  It was a marvelous partnership, and one that speaks to 
the great promise and potential of private philanthropy when it undertakes to bear risk on 
behalf of social innovation.  
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